Deadline: October 20, 2019 (but continuing on a rolling basis)
Session Organizer: Tom Narins (University at Albany)
Sponsored by the China Specialty Group, Polar Geography Specialty Group
We are entering a material revolution (Sanderson, 2015). Access to and control over key materials, namely minerals and metals, for use in a range of emerging technologies has ushered in a new era of geopolitical competitiveness and unease among countries seeking to become world leaders in critical, economically transformative, technology sectors (Dizard, 2017, Klinger 2017, Lucas and Feng, 2017). This narrative often seeks to place China (as an emerging economy), in direct competition with other developed and emerging economies seeking economic prosperity on the global stage. As national and global economies become ever more dependent on digital and information technologies, the material resources from which these technologies are constructed, become ever more critical to states, corporations, and individuals. Global, national, and local prosperity and peace are inextricably bound with managing risk that arises from supply disruptions of key metal, mineral and other natural resources. In light of the 2008 global financial crisis, many mature economies are interested in refocusing their efforts “on a foundation of substance and not financial, real estate, or dot-com bubbles” (Levine, 2016). Thus, tangible, manufactured technologies including automated machine tools and robots, information technology hardware, new energy vehicles, and solar and wind power equipment whose production rely on specific mineral and metal inputs, are viewed by the United States and China, for example, as being crucial growth industries over the next decade (Lucas and Feng, 2017).
Because of their technological and financial importance to national governments, resources such as cobalt, coltan, lithium, titanium, and rare earths which are widely viewed as essential for advancing key emerging technology industries have at times been referred to as “strategic” (Korinek and Kim, 2010), at other times as “critical” (Massari and Ruberti, 2013) and still at other times as “strategic and critical” (Humphries, 2015). Because these resources pose unique supply constraints (often located in sparsely populated areas: polar regions, deserts, etc.) that may prove detrimental to sustaining global emerging technology industries on which national economic prosperity and political tranquility depend, such strategic materials can be considered as ‘bottleneck resources’. How to account for the unique supply constraints of bottleneck resources is an emerging puzzle governments and political leaders must address in order to keep their economies connected to major global economic trends and processes.
Strategic and critical resources are often the forerunners of tomorrow’s revolutionary technologies, many of which bring power and influence to particular countries (Standage, 2017). As David Brewster, the 19th century British physicist once said of machines “those mechanical wonders which in one century enriched the conjuror who used them, contributed in another to augment the wealth of a nation” (Brewster in Standage, 2017). This crucial link between technological innovation and national strength continues to be central to harnessing political power at the global scale. Increasingly, access to and control over key bottleneck resources will determine which countries become dominant in the most lucrative emerging technology sectors and, in turn, retain or gain geopolitical influence.
The aim of this session is to grapple with the geopolitics of strategic natural resources from the local to the global scales, and in so doing, the session will attempt to highlight the various strategies employed by geopolitical actors (e.g. China, Japan, Russia, US, UK, South Korea, Brazil) in terms of their willingness to compete and cooperate as each government seeks to gain relevance for playing a leading role in emerging global technology-related industries (e.g. electric battery manufacturing). Both empirical and more theoretical, conceptually-driven papers are encouraged and will be considered. Papers may address any of the following (non-exhaustive) topics:
• The politics of technological development
• The politics of natural resources
• The politics of the emerging economies
• The politics of geo-economic development
• Polar Geography
• China and the Global Economy
• Chinese economic development
• Chinese Geopolitics & Sovereignty
• Geopolitics & Technology
• Governance in the Global Economy
• Natural resource extraction & Sovereignty
• Sovereignty and spaces of exception
• China and International Political Economy
• Natural Resources and Environmental Management
To participate, please send paper titles and abstracts (250 words maximum) to Tom Narins (tnarins@albany.edu). Authors will be notified of paper acceptance on a rolling basis starting on 17 October.
**References**
DeBoom, M.J. 2017. “Nuclear (Geo)Political Ecologies: A Hybrid Geography of Chinese Investment in Namibia’s Uranium Sector.” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 46, No. 3, 53-83.
Dizard, J. 2017. Lack of ethical cobalt sets Tesla up for a date with reality before its debt matures. The Financial Times. August 12/13, 2017.
Humphries, M. 2015. China’s Mineral Industry and U.S. Access to Strategic and Critical Minerals: Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service. January 9, 2015.
Klinger, J. 2017. Rare Earth Frontiers. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Korinek, J. and Kim, J. 2010. “Export Restrictions on Strategic Raw Materials and Their Impact on Trade”, OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 95, OECD Publishing, Paris. dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kmh8pk441g8-en
Levine, S. 2016. The Powerhouse: America, China and the Great Battery War. New York: Random House.
Lucas, L. and Feng, E. 2017. Remaking China. The Financial Times. March 20, 2017.
Massari, S. and Ruberti, M. 2013. Rare earth elements as critical raw materials: Focus on international markets and future strategies. Resources Policy 38 (2013) 36–43.
Sanderson, H. 2015. 2015. Material revolution. The Financial Times. December 9, 2015.
Standage, T. 2017. Flights of Fancy. The Economist – 1843. August & September 2017. p. 105.